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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 950350-CA

:

Priority No. 2

vs.
CLINT DONALD YOUNG,
Defendant/Appellant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
TESTIMONY OP OTHER BAD ACTS IN VIOLATION OF
RULES 404(b) AND 403, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
A.

Defendant's motion in limine adequately preserved for appeal
the issue of inadmissibility of other bad acts under rule
404(b) and 403.
The State first contends that regardless of the correctness

or incorrectness of the trial court's ruling on the admissibility
of Holly Hales' testimony, the issue was not properly preserved
for appeal. Although Young originally raised the Rule 404(b) and
403 issues in a motion in limine, argues the State, his failure
to renew the objection during trial, in accordance with Utah Rule
of Evidence 103(a), constituted a waiver of any objection and
thus precludes him from raising the issues on appeal.
The Supreme Court of Utah has held, however, that a
defendant is not required to object or renew his or her objection
1

at trial to preserve the issue for appeal when a pretrial motion
regarding the issue was made, when the trial judge was the same
judge who ruled on the pretrial motion, and when the transcript
indicates that a hearing on the motion was held.

See State v.

Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Utah 1987); State v. Mitchell,
779 P.2d 1116, 1119 n.4 (Utah 1989); State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d
1221, 1229 n.9 (Utah 1989).
Each of the elements of the Johnson test have been
satisfied.

First, Young outlined his objections to the

admissibility of other bad acts in a pretrial motion to limit the
admissibility of evidence (R. 32-38).

Second, Judge Boyd L. Park

both ruled on the motion and presided over the trial.1 Third,
hearing regarding Young's motion was held during trial.

a

Thus

according to Johnson, Young was not required to renew his 404(b)
or 4 03 objections or otherwise alert the court at the time of the
trial.

The objections set forth in Young's motion in limine were

sufficient to preserve the issues for appeal.
Moreover, on appeal, Young has also argued that the trial
court's erroneous admission of Hales' testimony constituted
"plain error"--error that was both obvious and prejudicial (Br.
of Appellant at 13-14 n.2, 14-15).

See also,

infra.

*In a pretrial memorandum decision issued on January 13,
1995, Judge Park ruled "Defendant's Motion in Limine will be
considered at the time of trial, outside of the presence of the
jury and before counsel for plaintiff seeks to inquire into areas
covered by rules 403, 404 and 609" (R. 56).
2

B.

The trial
violation
evidence,
the trial

court inappropriately admitted evidence in
of rule 404(b) when the State, in introducing such
exceeded the scope of the permission granted by
court regarding the 404(b) evidence.

Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that "evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith.

It may, however, be admissible for other

purposes, such as proof of. . . opportunity . . . [or]
identity. . . . "

Aware of the significance of this rule and the

effects that admitting such evidence might have on the outcome of
the trial, the court, in ruling on Defendant's preliminary motion
to suppress evidence, instructed the State "not [to] inquire into
other crimes, wrongs or bad acts of the defendant at the time of
trial without first acquiring the court's permission to do so"
(R. 56).
When, during trial, State's counsel followed such
instructions and requested that Holly Hales' testimony be
introduced to show "identity" under rule 404(b), (2/15/94 Tr. at
345) the court indicated that the evidence the State intended to
bring out in Hales' testimony more appropriately showed
opportunity, rather than identity.

The court then indicated that

it would grant permission and allow such testimony, but further
instructed the prosecution that it would do so only for the
purpose of showing opportunity (2/15/95 Tr. at 357).
Upon questioning Hales, however, the State exceeded the
scope of the trial court's permission.

Rather than limiting

testimony to Hales' recalling that she had seen Young in
3

possession of a check from the same account as that used in the
forgery committed at Albertson's (testimony that would
appropriately show opportunity), the State elicited further
testimony from Hales that did not show opportunity-

Hales'

further testimony consisted of statements that Young, whom she
had known since childhood, had committed forgery against her and
GGG Foods using a check from the same account as had been used in
the Albertson's forgery, and that she had been fired as result of
her acceptance of the bad check from Young (2/15/95 Tr. at 202208).

In addition, Hales was allowed to testify that Young had

even called her after the incident to apologize (2/15/95 Tr. at
208) .
Although Hales' testimony that she saw Young with a check
from the same account as the one used at Albertsons does show
opportunity as permitted by rule 404(b), her further testimony
does not.

The extraneous facts to which Hales also testified--

her childhood familiarity with Young, his commission of a similar
fraud against her at her place of employment, her subsequent loss
of employment, and Young's subsequent phone call and apology to
Hales--were all irrelevant in showing opportunity.

Such

testimony exceeded the scope of rule 404(b) and the permission
granted by the court, and thus should have been excluded.
C.

The trial court erroneously admitted Hales' testimony since
such testimony was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403.
Even if Hales' extraneous testimony is considered relevant

to showing opportunity, such evidence should have been excluded
as it violated Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 provides that
4

relevant evidence may be excluded if "its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice...."
Indeed, the testimony offered by Hales was unfairly
prejudicial.

As stated by the court in State v. Burk. 839 P.2d

880, 883 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah
1993),
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to
influence the outcome of the trial by improper means or if
it appeals to the juries sympathies or arouses its sense of
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes
a jury to base its decision on something other than the
established propositions of the case.
See also

State v. Lindaren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1996) .

Hales' testimony satisfies the criteria set forth by Burk.

Her

testimony "influenced the outcome of the trial by improper means"
by intimating that Young must have been the one who committed the
forgery at Albertson's.

It "aroused [the jury's] sense of horror

[and] provoke [d] its instinct to punish" because it suggested
that Young likely commits forgeries on a regular basis.
Furthermore, it caused "the jury to base its decision on
something other than the established propositions of the case"
since it brought to the jury's attention the alleged commission
of separate--but similar--criminal conduct admitted to by Young
for which he should be punished (2/15/95 Tr. at 202-208). The
prejudice created by Hale's testimony substantially outweighed
any probative value that may have existed, and thus should have
been excluded.
Moreover, this error was obvious.

Since 1988, Utah

appellate courts have repeatedly held that before evidence is
5

admissible under Rule 404(b) it must be considered in light of
the requirements of Rule 403 the trial court's failure to conduct
such an inquiry must be considered "obvious" error.

See State v.

Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1989); State v. Shickles. 760
P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988); State v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 701
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993); State v.
Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994).
Young's assertion that Hales' testimony should have been
excluded as inadmissible under rule 403 is further supported by
the Utah Supreme Court's determination in State v. Dibello. 780
P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989), that when evidence is "subject to
being used to distort the deliberative process and skew the
trial's outcome, . . .

[relevant evidence's] potential for

unfair prejudice is presumed to outweigh its probativeness, and
the burden is on the proponent to show that such is not so."
also

See

State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1191 (Utah 1996).
As illustrated above, much of Hales' testimony had the

propensity to "distort the deliberative process and skew the
trial's outcome" because of it's prejudicial nature and because
it allowed the jury to base it's decision on evidence that did
not tend to show opportunity under rule 404(b).

Thus the trial

court should have presumed Hales' testimony to be prejudicial and
excluded it as such, since no evidence to the contrary was
proffered.

6

D.

T!i error in admitting the evidence was harmful.
The State contends that any error that was committed in

admitting Hales' testimony was harmless-

Error is considered

harmful "if absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of
an outcome more favorable to the defendant."
910 P.2d at 1271.

State v. Lindaren,

The likelihood of a more favorable outcome is

dependant upon the overall strength of the State's case.
v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah App. 1994).

State

Accordingly,

"the more evidence supporting the verdict, the less likely there
was harmful error" and the less evidence sustaining the verdict,
the more likely it is that harmful error existed.

State v.

Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992).
Although the State presented evidence which may have
suggested Young's guilt, this evidence was significantly weakened
in several respects, indicating the existence of harmful error.
First, both Johnson and Knighton testified that Young was the one
who cashed the check at Albertson's.

However there were

significant difference's in the witnesses' descriptions of Young.
Johnson, for example, testified that the individual who presented
the check and driver's license was wearing levi's, a blue tank
top, and cowboy boots, and that while the photo in the driver's
license had a beard, the person who presented the check was clean
shaven (2/25/95 Tr. at 97, 101, 102). Knighton, on the other
hand, testified that Young was wearing a cowboy hat, as well as
cowboy boots, and that he had a large mustache or goatee (2/15/95
Tr. at 110, 111, 114).
7

Furthermore, Johnson admitted that he served approximately
100-300 individuals per day (2/15/95 Tr. at 272). This indicates
that between the time the check was cashed and the time an
officer returned with a photo for identification, Johnson had
seen perhaps as many as 3000 individuals.

Moreover, although

Johnson positively identified Young from a photo shown to him by
Detective Nielson, Nielson admitted that only one picture was
shown to Johnson, rather than several from which Johnson might
choose the offender, and that this was not the best way to get an
accurate identification (2/15/95 Tr. 320-321).

In addition,

Knighton also admitted that he saw the individual in question
from 10 feet away, for a brief period of time, and that the
identification took place while he was approving the check for
acceptance (2/15/95 Tr. at 292-293).
Second, although the State presented evidence by Chuck Senn,
a handwriting analyst, who stated that it was "highly probable"
that the signature on the check matched the signature on Young's
driver's license, Senn further testified that he had difficulty
analyzing the copy of Young's license, that he did not have
enough writing to come to a positive conclusion, and that it was
not uncommon to experience differences in opinion among analysts
(2/15/95 Tr. at 335, 338, 364, 369).
Finally, both Young and his father testified that Young has
never owned nor worn cowboy boots or a cowboy hat (2/15/95 Tr. at
192-193, 217, 219) and that Young had lost his driver's license
almost a year prior to trial (2/15/95 Tr. at 193-194, 218-219).
8

Because of the weaknesses in the State's evidence, the
prejudicial testimony of Holly Hales sufficiently bolstered the
strength of the State's case so as to render the State more
likely to succeed with Hales' testimony than without it. Thus,
because a more favorable outcome to Young could reasonably have
been foreseen had Hales' testimony not been admitted, the error
was harmful.
POINT II
YOUNG WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 670, 104 S.Ct
2052, 2056 (1984), to prove ineffective assistance of counsel a
Defendant must show (1) that his counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the
outcome of the trial would probably have been different but for
counsel's error.
A.

Young meets both requirements.

Trial counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.
Young asserts that counsel was ineffective in that it should

have requested the court to balance the prejudicial nature of
Hales' testimony against it's probative value, objected to the
scope of the testimony of Hales, and requested a limiting jury
instruction to clarify how Hales' testimony was to be used.
Because counsel failed to do any of these, his assistance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness.

This is supported

by the fact that the trial court itself, during a bench
conference immediately after direct questioning of Hales, told
the State that the court "would have probably stopped [it]
9

quicker on a couple of questions. . . . "

(2/15/95 Tr. at 394).

The fact that the court itself indicated that portions of Hales'
testimony should have been limited or excluded in some way,
confirms that Young's counsel should reasonably have known to
request himself that Hales' testimony be limited, and that
representation fell below a reasonable standard.
B.

A reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to the
accused existed.
Young further satisfies the second element of Strickland

since, as discussed in Point I, D supra, had Hales' testimony
been excluded or limited, a reasonable probability of a more
favorable result existed.

In this case, the adversarial process

cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.

For the

same reasons the trial court's error was harmful, Young's trial
counsel's deficiencies were likewise prejudicial, and therefore,
this Court's confidence in the verdict must be undermined.
Accordingly, Young asks this Court to vacate his conviction
because he was denied his constitutional right to effective
counsel.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing reasons, because of the trial
court's error in admitting prejudicial testimony of a prior
criminal act, and because of trial court's ineffectiveness, this
Court should vacate Young's conviction and remand the case for a
new trial.
10

DATED this

11
(y^

day of May, 1996.

Attorney for Young
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